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Abstract 
 
As banking markets in developing countries are maturing, banks face competition not only 
from other domestic banks but also from sophisticated foreign banks. Combined with a 
dramatic growth of consumer credit and increased regulatory attention to risk management, the 
development of a well-functioning credit assessment framework is essential. As part of such a 
framework, we propose a credit scoring model for Vietnamese retail loans. First, we show how 
to identify those borrower characteristics that should be part of a credit scoring model. Second, 
we illustrate how such a model can be calibrated to achieve the strategic objectives of the bank. 
Finally, we assess the use of credit scoring models in the context of transactional versus 
relationship lending. 
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1. Introduction 
Are retail loans simply small versions of syndicated loans with single-lender 
syndicates? Advocates of relationship lending tend to answer this question with ‘no’. Since 
retail borrowers are typically unrated small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) or 
individuals, information about them is not readily available but needs to be obtained through 
close contact over the life of a bank-client relationship. Relationship lending is thus based on 
soft, proprietary information. Loan approval or pricing decisions are not only determined by 
exact characteristics such as the borrower’s income or collateral but to a large extent also by 
qualitative information such as the borrower’s character, reputation, or standing in the 
community. However, banks have realized that relationships are expensive to maintain and that 
loan decisions based on relationship criteria might not always be profit maximizing. Despite 
these disadvantages, large banks in industrialized countries have increasingly become 
interested in retail lending mainly driven by the higher return on assets in this market segment. 
With them, they are bringing their skills in transactional lending where lending decisions are 
based on exact, quantifiable borrower characteristics supported by a quantitative model, such 
as a credit scoring model (CSM). In the US, the most widely used models in retail banking are 
those of Fair Isaac and Co. Inc. who developed models for small business trade credit in 1998, 
small business credit in 1999, and finally personal credit in 2001.  
The US is undoubtedly a country with a high availability of retail credit information 
where banks can easily implement CSMs and reap the benefits in terms of reduced loan losses, 
lower administrative cost, larger geographical reach, or increase in loan volume.1 More 
recently, these models have been applied in other developed countries such as Canada or 
Japan. In the retail banking markets of developing countries where relationship lending 
characterized by severe credit rationing is the norm, there are substantial implication hurdles. 
Many banking markets are characterized by poor lending practices including insider lending or 
fraud. Additionally, banks, i.e. small banks or micro-financiers lack the necessary data on 
borrower characteristics and their credit histories to design reliable CSMs. It is therefore not 
surprising that only a few of the largest banks in developing countries have developed such 
models. Given this lack of data for most financial intermediaries, data pooled from various 
banks – as used in the US by Fair Isaac – would be a solution. However, up to now the 
dominant banks in developing markets seem intent on protecting their market shares in the 
profitable retail segment and are thus reluctant to share information. The World Bank together 
                                            
1 See Allen et al. (2004) for details. 
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with Fair Isaac is currently investigating the feasibility of collecting pooled data for Brazil, 
Colombia and Mexico.2  
This paper addresses the lack of information on retail credit scoring from a different 
angle. Based on detailed data of one of Vietnam’s commercial banks, we develop a CSM for 
retail loans. In the process, we identify which borrower characteristics a bank needs to collect 
and how these can be combined into a scoring model. Furthermore, we develop a flexible 
approach which is build on the principles of transactional lending but leaves room for 
relationship lending. The remaining of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a 
general CSM as currently applied for consumer credit and illustrates the modeling steps and 
decisions that have to be taken. In section 3 a model is implemented using the retail loan 
population of a Vietnamese commercial bank. Specific features of the model are explored in 
section 4 with specific focus on profit implications and relationship lending. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. A credit scoring methodology for retail loans 
CSMs are commonly structured along the lines of Altman’s (1968) Z-score model. In a 
first step, a CSM uses historical data combined with a statistical technique - a linear probability 
model, a logit or probit regression model, or multiple discriminant analysis – in order to 
identify which borrower characteristics are best able to distinguish between defaulted and non-
defaulted loans. In a second step, the model is used to calculate a score for each new loan 
applicant. In principle a higher score indicates better expected performance of the borrower 
and thus a lower probability of default (PD). This score needs to be compared to a cut-off rate 
to determine whether the application is accepted, rejected or requires further assessment. Thus, 
a calibration of the model is necessary such that an optimal cut-off rate is determined.  
Regarding the first step, we opt in this study for the implementation of a logistic 
regression model. Based on a sample of existing loans, both borrower characteristics and 
default status are observed.  We are in fact dealing with a problem of unobservable variables as 
we can only observe ex post whether or not a borrower defaulted but cannot directly measure a 
borrower’s ex ante PD. The logistic regression technique overcomes this problem by directly 
estimating this probability and has therefore been the methodology of choice for retail credits 
(see Schreiner, 1999).3 This technique assumes the existence of a continuous variable Zj which 
                                            
2 See Miller and Rojas (2004) for details. 
3 There is an extensive literature on classification accuracy of different methodologies including next to logistic 
regressions also linear discriminant analyses, classification trees, and neural networks. Based on findings by 
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is defined as the probability that applicant j defaults and can be modeled as a linear function of 
a set of variables x: 
 
jkkj22j11j x w  x w x wx  W' Z +…++==  (1)  
 
where wk is the coefficient of the kth variable and xjk is the value of variable k for applicant j. Zj  
is known as Z-Score of the jth applicant. If Z were observable, an OLS regression could simply 
be fitted to estimate equation (1). However, since Z is unobservable, default can only be 
defined ex post as a 0-1 dummy. Equation (2) then derives the default probability π using an 
iterative maximum likelihood estimation method. Here, larger values of π reflect a higher PD. 
 
x)(W'j e1
1π −+=  (2) 
 
After deciding on the methodology, a choice has to be made among the variables x that 
should initially be considered for equation (1). There is no overall consensus. Some credit 
scoring models start out with as many as 50 variables including for example First Data 
Resources’ model for credit cards lenders (Mester, 1997) or Caisse Nationale de Crédit 
Agricole du Burkina Faso for rural microfinance (Viganó, 1993). Efficiency and applicability 
however stipulate that these numbers are reduced to as few as 10 to 15. The different 
procedures that can facilitate this reduction are explained in more detail below. Table 1 
presents a list of the more commonly used variables for retail CSMs. Viganó’s (1993) and 
Schreiner’s (1999) CSMs are the only ones developed explicitly for developing countries. 
Whereas in CSMs for business loans, the variables are relatively similar across countries and 
limited to financial statement data (Allen et al., 2004), the variables relevant in retail credit 
scoring models are clearly different. Similar to the financial statement data for firms, direct 
measures of the financial strength of the borrower such as income or value of the home are 
included. Given the limited available of such proxies for individuals, proxies that measure the 
financial strength of a borrower indirectly (education, household size, years at employer, or 
postal code) need to be included.   
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
                                                                                                                                          
Boyle et al. (1992), Desai et al. (1996, 1997), Henley (1995), Srinivasan and Kim (1987), and Yobas et al. (1997) 
as reported by Thomas (2000), we opt for the logistic regression method. 
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Next to the choice of independent variables, two further issues need to be considered: The 
coding of the variables and the procedure used to identify the relevant variables. Regarding the 
first issue, note that coding is necessary for qualitative as well as quantitative variables. The 
coding of quantitative variables is required when the relationship between the variable and 
default is not linear. Consider for example the relationship between loan duration and default 
for Vietnamese retail loans as presented in Panel A of Figure 1. As Thomas (2000) argues, 
instead of trying to map such a curve as a straight line, one could either model it as a more 
complex curve or one could decided to group consumers into a number of categories and think 
of duration as a categorical variable. The later approach is more commonly used in credit 
scoring mainly because this procedure can also applied to qualitative variables. Based on the 
distribution shown in Panel A, categories of <13, 13-24, 25-36, 37-48, >48 months are chosen. 
Panel B illustrates how the categories reflect the default-duration relationship.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
To complete the coding of the variables, a value has to be attached to each category. According 
to Boyle et al. (1992) there are three possibilities at this stage. First, binary variables can be 
defined for each possible category of each variable. For duration shown in Figure 1 there are 
five categories. Thus, four dummy variables must be defined which are coded 1 if the loan 
duration falls into a given category and zero otherwise. When the number of categories is high, 
this can however substantially increase the number of independent variables x in the model. A 
second method is a location model that constructs a different linear discriminant function over 
the continuous variables for each possible combination of the values of the discrete variables. 
Third, the variables can be coded based on distribution of defaulted and non-defaulted loans in 
the sample. If a variable has m categories, let gi be the number of good (non-defaulted) loans 
who belong to the ith category and bi the number of bad (defaulted) loans who belong to the ith 
category. G and B are the total number of good and bad loans in the whole sample, 
respectively, such that 
 
∑∑
==
==
m
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i
m
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Instead of using a simple coding rule4, a value based on gi, bi, B, and G is assigned to the ith 
category. Boyle et al. (1992) describe several possible combinations which are related to 
estimates of probability odds or log probability odds of the good and bad loans in the ith 
category:  
 
gi/bi (4a) 
gi/(gi+ bi) (4b) 
bi/(gi+ bi) (4c) 
log(gi/(gi+ bi))  (4d) 
ln(gi/bi) + ln(B/G) (4e) 
 
Crook et al. (1992) recommend the last of these estimates because of its sophistication. We 
follow this recommendation when coding our variables. For our exemplary, quantitative 
variable loan duration, the result is shown in Panel C of Figure 1. A special problem arises for 
qualitative variables. When the number of possible categories is very large, for example for 
variables such as postcode or occupation, coding all categories becomes infeasible. For such 
cases, Thomas (2000) and Boyle et al. (1992) recommend aggregating values of similar default 
probability measured as bi/(gi+bi).  
Once the variables have been coded, equation (1) can be estimated. As is evident from 
the development of retail CSMs in developed countries, the model can initially contain a large 
number of variables. Whereas this might be statistically feasible for large samples, there are 
practical considerations. Too many questions in an application form deter loan applicants, who 
will not answer all questions or apply for a loan elsewhere. It is thus critical to determine how 
many and which variables incorporated in the model. Henley and Hand (1997) discuss three 
approaches to select variables. First, expert knowledge and a feeling for the data and 
characteristics can help in the selection. The latter will help in excluding non-predictive 
variables and the former will help in justifying the chosen variables. Second, a stepwise 
statistical procedure can be used. For example, forward stepwise methods sequentially add 
variables to maximize the model’s predictive accuracy. Third, individual variables are selected 
based on the difference between the distribution of defaulted versus non-defaulted loans for 
that variable. One common used measure is the information value, defined as: 
 
                                            
4 A simple rule would assign the value of 1 to category with lowest PD, 2 to category with second highest PD, etc. 
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where pij is the number of non-defaulted loans in category i that have a value of j divided by 
the total of non-defaulted loans in category i. Correspondingly, qij is calculated for defaulted 
loans. Typically, any characteristic j with an information value larger than 0.1 will be included 
in the model. In this study, we apply the first and second approach. The first approach will be 
used to identify an initial set of 22 variables. The second approach will then be applied to 
select the most relevant variables from this initial set.  
 When the final version of the CSM has been determined and the coefficients wj have 
been estimated, the CSM should be tested for its predictive accuracy. This is best done out-of-
sample as the model predicts over-accurately in-sample. In other words, a different sample of 
defaulted and non-defaulted loans should be used to for step 1, the development of the model, 
and step 2, the calibration of the model. Thus, the PD for each loan in the calibration-sample is 
estimated. This PD is then compared to a cut-off value to predict whether the loan applicant 
will be a good (non-defaulting) or bad (defaulting) borrower. Initially, a cut-off value of 50% 
can be chosen. In this case, an applicant who’s estimated PD is greater than 50% will be 
classified as a bad (defaulting) loan and an applicant who’s estimated PD is less than 50% will 
be classified as a good (non-defaulting) loan. This classification is then compared to the 
observed event of default to establish the accuracy of the model. A classification table as 
shown in Table 2 is commonly employed at this stage. Gg represents the number of correctly 
classified good loans whereas Gb represents the number of good loans that are incorrectly 
classified as bad loans. Similarly, Bb represents the number of correctly classified bad loans 
whereas Bg represents the number of bad loans that are incorrectly classified as good loans. 
The percentage of correctly classified (PCC) loans is an accuracy measure that is easily 
obtained from this table. As an overall measure, the percentage of correctly classified total 
loans is defined as the number of correctly classified loans relative to the total number of loans: 
 
PCCtotal = (Gg+Bb) / (Gg+Gb+Bb+Bg)  (6) 
 
Furthermore, the percentage of correctly classified bad loans is defined as proportion of 
correctly classified bad loans to the total number of observed bad loans: 
 
PCCbad = Bb / (Bb+Bg) (7) 
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Finally, the percentage of correctly classified good loans is defined as proportion of correctly 
classified good loans to the total number of observed good loans: 
 
PCCgood = Gg / (Gg+Gb) (8) 
 
Though simple to use, PCC may not always be an appropriate accuracy measure. It implicitly 
assumes that the costs of misclassification of bad and good loans are equal. For banks, one 
classification error may, however, be much more expensive than another. Another, often 
violated assumption of PCC is that the class distribution is constant over time and relatively 
balanced (Provost et al., 1998). Baesens et al. (2003) use two additional accuracy measures 
called sensitivity (SENS) and specificity (SPEC). In contrast to PCCbad which relates the 
predicted bad loans to the total number of observed bad loans, SPEC is defined as proportion 
of correctly classified bad loans to the total number of predicted bad loans:   
 
SPEC = Bb / (Bb + Gb) (9)   
 
Here the denominator corresponds to the total number of rejected loans. SENS is defined as 
number classified good loans relative to the total number of predicted good loans:  
 
SENS = Gg / (Gg + Bg)  (10) 
 
It is easy to understand that banks want to minimize both Bg and Gb at the same time. 
However, reducing Bg comes at the expense of increasing Gb, and vice versa. Thus banks 
should take into account its differences in cost arising from misclassified good versus bad 
loans. For most banks the cost of Bg will be higher than the cost Gb and the CSM can be 
calibrated based on SENS. In section 4.1. we introduce a more advanced method that takes 
these two costs explicitly into account. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
3. An application to the Vietnamese retail lending market 
In 1987, Vietnam started its transformation to a market economy. Part of this process is 
the replacement of the monopoly of state-owned banks by a two-level banking system 
consisting of a national central bank on one level and state-owned as well as commercial banks 
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on the other level.5 Projects to modernize the inter-bank market, to create an international 
accounting system, and to allow outside audits of major Vietnamese banks are ongoing. 
However, the banking system continues to suffer from lack of capital, inadequate provisions 
for possible loan losses, low profitability, inexperience in capital markets, and the slow pace of 
institutional reform. With respect to risk assessment and management there are numerous 
difficulties including a lack of transparency in non-performing loan disclosure. There is for 
example no uniform definition of a non-performing loan. It is thus not surprising that non-
performing loan rates range from 3% based on banks’ official financial reports to 35-70% 
based on figures by the World Bank or IMF.6 In order to improve risk management, The 
Vietnam’s central bank is currently reviewing its risk management regulations in light of Basel 
II. As part of a broader strategy, which also addresses the banks’ business strategy, assets and 
liability management, and internal audit, all state-owned commercial banks and joint-stock 
commercial banks have been asked to develop a comprehensive credit manual which takes 
international practices in risk management into account. The development of a proper CSM is 
an important building block within this credit manual.  
 To illustrate the current state of credit assessment in Vietnam, Table 3 summarizes the 
most advanced credit scoring system as it is currently used by one of Vietnam’s commercial 
banks. This bank scores applicants based on 14 variables in a two step procedure. In a first 
assessment round, a loan applicant is evaluated based on the nine criteria listed in Panel A. If 
her score is higher than a certain threshold, she will be evaluated again based on the criteria 
listed in Panel B. Otherwise, she is rejected directly without any further consideration. Based 
on the total score from both rounds, the loan applicant will be rated as shown in Panel C. From 
the 14 variables used to score applicants, only four variables are included in Crook et al.’s 
(1992) list of the 24 most typical variables as given in Table 1. These are time with present 
employer, residential status, number of dependants, and income. The incorporation of these 
factors into the credit assessment system of a commercial bank in Vietnam might indicate that 
despite the difference in economic development between Vietnam and industrialized countries, 
some of the same factors are relevant for the credit decision making. Though considered as a 
good starting point, the credit assessment system presented in Table 3 is a qualitative method 
where scores and weights of each variable are not the result of a statistical approach but based 
on experience and judgment of the credit officer. More importantly, with this system, the bank 
                                            
5 Currently this second level of the Vietnamese banking system contains 5 state-owned commercial banks, 1 
social policy bank, 31 foreign bank branches, 40 foreign credit institution representative offices, 5 joint-venture 
commercial banks, 36 domestic joint-stock commercial banks, 7 finance companies, and the Central People’s 
Credit Fund System with 23 branches and 888 local credit funds. 
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cannot estimate PD and therefore can not exploit this estimate in improving its risk 
management. Given the high levels of non-performing loans, the development of a more 
sophisticated CSM seems indeed necessary. In the remainder of this section, we develop such a 
model based on the retail loan portfolio of another of Vietnam’s commercial banks. 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
3.1 Sample selection 
To develop a CSM, all retail loans that were outstanding on a given day in 2005 were 
extracted from the database of one of Vietnam’s commercial banks. This loan population 
contains mortgages, consumer loans, credit card loans or business loans to borrowers from all 
over Vietnam. The bank classifies loans with more than 90 days of payment delay or at least 
three consecutive payment delays as defaulted. Defaulted loans account for 4.9% in the total 
population. Currently, the bank uses more than 30 characteristics in its loan decision. There 
are, however, many missing values.7 Overall, less than 10% of the applicants have full 
information for all characteristics. In order to obtain a sufficiently large sample of loans with 
complete information, 22 variables with relatively few missing values are identified. This leads 
to a sample of 56,037 loans. This sample contains 3.3% defaulted loans which is only slightly 
lower than 4.9% in the total loan population.8 This could imply that a customer who 
sufficiently fills in the application form has a lower PD than someone who does not properly 
complete the application form. This is consistent with one of strategies used in practice for 
coping with missing component as stated by Henley (1995): “a refusal to answer a particular 
question may be indicative of greater risk”. Our sample of 56,037 loans is thus based on the 22 
variables where the criteria for selecting these variables are based on the expert knowledge 
approach discussed above. These can overrule the requirement of no missing values and our 
sample thus contains the category ‘other’ which covers missing values. 
 The characteristics of our sample will become more evident section 3.1. when we 
discuss the 22 different variables included in our CSM. Therefore, only a quick overview of 
                                                                                                                                          
6 See Loi (2004). 
7 Such values may be structurally missing (e.g. question which are asked conditionally on the responses to 
previous questions). Alternatively, missing values might be due to a deficient information system in some 
branches or due to customers who themselves were not willing to completely fill in the application forms. 
8 The population PD of 4.90% is in line with the PD reported in general on banks’ financial statements but rather 
far below the alternative figures of 35% to 70% reported by the World Bank. For the purpose of this study we 
assume that the data provided to us by the bank accurately records all defaults. As long as any potential mis-
reporting is not structurally related to borrower characteristics (i.e. the variables included in our credit scoring 
model), this assumption is acceptable as it does not affect the estimation of the model but would only lead to an 
over-statement of the predictive accuracy of the model.  
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the sample will be given at this point. The bank distinguishes five borrower groups based on 
their loans’ purpose: Customers borrowing money to finance their business (business); 
customers borrowing money for purchase or maintenance of their house (house); customers 
borrowing money to finance mobile assets such as the purchase of a car or motorbike where 
the asset serves as collateral (collateralized); customers borrowing money for living expenses 
or consumption without collateral (general credit); and customers borrowing money via the 
bank’s credit card to finance their special expenses such as studying abroad (credit card). As 
this list shows, our sample includes consumer as well as commercial loans. In Vietnam as 
general and in our bank as particular, these business loans are used to finance relatively small 
and private businesses. Due to the lack of reliable up-to date financial data on those small 
commercial borrowers and due to the fact that the boundary between the private and business 
property of the entrepreneur is often vague, these loans can only be assessed based on the 
personal information of the entrepreneur. In terms of loan numbers, business loans and general 
credits are the most frequently occurring loan types and account for 36% and 39% of all loans. 
The other three loan types account for 5% to 10% of all loans, each. In terms of value, 
however, housing loans have a higher weight (36%) due to their larger average size of 244 
million Vietnamese Dong (VND) compared to business loans (VND 127 million, 39%) or 
general credits (VND 37 million, 17%). 
Finally, note that because sample contains only information of applicants who were 
accepted, it is not representative of the population who might be the future customers. We also 
cannot perceive how those applicants who were rejected would have performed if they had 
been accepted. A solution is the out-of-sample calibration of the model described in the 
previous section. We therefore divide the 56,037 loans into two sub-samples. The initial 
sample contains 30,994 loans of which 1026 (3.3%) are in default and the hold-out sample 
contains 25,043 applicants of which 798 (3.2%) are in default.  
 
3.2. Variable selection and coding 
As mentioned above, 22 variables are initially selected for inclusion in the CSM. These 
variables are listed in Table 4 and include nine quantitative and 13 qualitative variables. In 
comparison to the currently existing credit scoring models, our selection overlaps widely with 
Crook’s (1992) as well as Viganó’s (1993) list of commonly used variables.9 Variables that 
                                            
9 Viganó (1993) develops her CSM for small business loans to individuals and therefore focuses less on 
personal characteristics and more on entrepreneurial characteristics. Among her 53 variables, she 
includes the applicant’s gender, age and martial status but not number of dependents or residential 
status. 
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seem to be unique to developing countries are gender, loan duration, marital status, and 
education. As already illustrated in section 2 for loan duration, each variable is first split into 
categories and then coded. The categories as well as the associated PD can also be found in 
Table 4. When coding all variables based on equation (4e), two issues arise. First, in our 
sample ln(B/G) is constant. In practice, however, when banks are updating their CSM at 
regular intervals, this value will change with every update. Second, some qualitative variables 
like occupation or region have a large number of different values and thus possible categories. 
For example, 20 different occupations appear in the loan applications. As outlined in the 
previous section, we pool these 20 occupations according to their similarity of probability of 
default. Any occupations for which there were no defaulted loans were included in the 
category with lowest probability of default. This procedure is applied to all qualitative 
variables with a high number of different initial values.  
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
The 22 variables included in the model are discussed in detail below starting with the 
borrower’s personal characteristics and followed by variables describing the borrower’s 
banking relationship. 
Income presents the borrower’s monthly income in millions of VND. This is a 
commonly used proxy of the borrower’s financial wealthy and his ability to repay. Note that in 
our sample, the average (median) monthly income is 8.36 (4.0) million VND for non-defaulted 
and 1.85 (1.2) million VND for defaulted borrowers. In contrast, the average monthly income 
in Vietnam is only about 1.1  and 0.4 million VND for employees in the state and private 
sector, respectively (Nguyen, 2004). Thus, the bank’s borrowers – including the defaulted ones 
– have an income that lies clearly above the national average. Interestingly and expectedly, the 
applicants who do not reveal their income have higher than average default rate of 4.07% 
versus 3.3%. 
Regarding education we expect that better educated people have more stable, higher-
income employment and thus a lower PD. We therefore distinguish borrowers by the 
educational degree they hold.  
Occupation is one of commonly incorporated variables since it is highly correlated with 
income. Based on the 20 different occupations found in the sample, five categories are formed 
that pool occupations with similar default rates. As shown in Table 4, these categories range 
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from the highest default-rate category of military, police and journalists to the lowest default-
rate category of entrepreneurs and farmers. 
Employer type documents the type of company for which a borrower works such as 
state-owned, foreign, joint-stock company, etc. It does not reflect industries or sectors which is 
coded via occupation. In Vietnam, the type of company can be a good proxy for income level 
and stability. For example, employees of foreign companies, which are known to pay rather 
high salaries, have the lowest probability of default. For this variable, missing values are also 
very informative as borrowers who do not answer this question show the highest default rates. 
Time with employer measures the number of years that a borrower has been working for 
his current employer. The variable matters because it might reflect the satisfaction of the 
borrower with his current job. The higher the borrower’s job satisfaction, the more stable their 
employment will be and the higher their ability to repay their loans (Crook et al., 1992). In our 
sample, however, defaulted borrowers have a slightly longer time with their employer but 
given the large standard deviation this might not be statistically significant. For Vietnam, time 
with employer might just proxy the same underlying relationship as age as younger people are 
switching jobs more often than older people while at the same time having lower default rates.  
Age measures the borrower’s age in years. It is often assumed that older borrowers are 
more risk adverse and will therefore be less likely to default. Thomas (2000) and Boyle et al. 
(1992) can also confirm this empirically. For our sample, however, the opposite seems to hold. 
The age variable is categorized into 5 groups: 18-24, 25-35, 36-45, 46-64, and older than 65. 
With the exception of the 46-64 age group, the default rate increases steadily from about 
1.98% to 4.66%. This could either be due to the fact that banks are more hesitant to lend to 
younger borrowers are that older people are indeed less rather than more risk averse. 
Gender can no longer be included in credit scoring models for many industrialized 
countries as it is deemed discriminatory.  When developing a credit scoring framework, 
Schreiner (2003) argues that fair discrimination – for example based on the statistical default 
rates of men versus women – is acceptable as it is based on quantifiable data. The alternative – 
subjective scoring – discriminates equally if not more. Overall, there is ample evidence that 
women default less frequently on loans (Coval et al., 2000) possibly because they are more risk 
adverse. We thus include gender in our CSM. Note that for this as well as all other binary 
variables, coding the variable based on equation (4e) leads to a more precise measure than 
simply assigning values of 0 and 1. 
Region represents the area of the country where the borrower lives. As people of 
similar wealth tend to live in the same location (a suburb might attract richer residents and the 
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resulting increase in housing and property prices make this suburb prohibitively expensive for 
poorer households), this geographic criterion can indicate a borrower’s level of financial 
wealth. A typical proxy is an area’s postal code but in Vietnam a postal code is not part of the 
address. Instead, we approximate the region with the branch where the loan is issued. 
According to the bank’s policy, borrowers can only obtain loans from their local branches and 
branch location therefore coincides with the borrowers’ residential area. The numerous 
branches were categorized based on their similarity in default rates and four categories finally 
emerged: the north, center, south (excluding Ho Chi Minh City) of the country, and Ho Chi 
Minh City. Note that with this coding, region might not only be a proxy for the borrower’s 
wealth but also reflect the current credit assessment ability of the different branches. In our 
sample, it appears that borrowers from Ho Chi Minh City are the best borrowers and those 
from the center are the worst. This make sense since the average income per person in Ho Chi 
Minh City is highest, followed by the north and south, while the center is the poorest area in 
Vietnam with lowest average income per person (World Bank, 2004). 
Time at present address represents the number of years that the borrowers have been 
living at their current address. Crook et al. (1992) find that default risk drops with an increase 
in this variable. In this sense, time at present address might be a proxy for the borrower’s 
maturity, stability, or risk aversion. However, this relationship does not hold in Vietnam where 
default rates increase with the time at the present address. In Vietnam, people who acquire 
financial wealth tend to seek better living conditions. This often includes moving to a new 
home in a better area. Thus, changing address might be a signal that a borrower’s financial 
wealth is high and/or improving rapidly. Under these conditions, he is better able to repay his 
loan.  
Residential status indicates whether borrowers own their home, rent, or live with their 
parents. Ex ante, the relationship between residential status and default is unclear. On the one 
hand, residential status can indicate financial wealth in particular in the case of home 
ownership. On the other hand, residential status can indicate increased financial pressure on the 
borrower’s income through insurance fees, taxes, or electricity cost. Crook et al. (1992) find 
that those who are most likely to default belong to the “other” category whereas borrowers 
living with their parents are least likely to default. We expect that this ranking will be different 
for our sample since the reasons of having a certain residential status in Vietnam are dissimilar 
from those in industrialized countries. Almost 90% of all borrowers own their homes. If this 
home is used a collateral, default rates are among the lowest whereas default rates are highest 
when this home is not used as collateral. This can be explained by the importance of owning a 
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house in Vietnamese society, which leads to a strong aversion of many borrowers to loose their 
house. 
Marital status can matter if it has an effect on the responsibility, reliability, or maturity 
of borrowers. In our sample, however, default rates are higher for married than single 
borrowers. This unexpected result could be due to the fact that marital status is related to age or 
number of dependants.  
Number of dependants represents the number of people that the borrower has to 
support. Crook et al. (1992) separate this variable into two categories, the number of children 
and the number of other dependants. In this study, we measure the total number of dependants 
though this variable mostly reflects the number children. As the number of dependants 
increases, so does the pressure on the borrower’s income due to higher expenses such as school 
fees. In Vietnam as in industrialized countries, the default rate increases steadily with the 
number of dependents. For example, moving from zero to three dependants quadruples the 
default risk from 1.1% to 4.3%.   
Home phone measures whether a customer has a home phone or not and can indicate 
that the bank can easier to keep contact with that borrower. As in Crook et al. (1992), not 
having a home phone is associated with a higher default risk.  
Mobile phone is defined similarly to home phone. Due to its wide-spread use in 
industrialized countries, this variable does not occur in credit scoring models for these 
countries. However, in Vietnam, having a mobile phone is still a good indication of the 
financial wealth. This fact may disappear in some years as the use of mobile phones spreads. 
Currently less than 30% of the bank’s borrowers have a mobile phone and mobile phone is 
associated with a much lower default risk. 
As the first two variables that measure the borrower’s banking relationship, loan 
purpose describes the reasons why the borrower needs a loan and how the funds are used and 
collateral type measures what type of collateral supports the loan. Collateral type is a unique 
variable that is not incorporated in CSMs for industrialized countries. For microfinance in 
developing countries, Schreiner (1999) has a similar variable measuring the guarantee type 
(none, personal, multiple, other guarantee) for Bolivia and Viganó includes dummies for 
pledges, sales or personal guarantees for Burkina Faso. In our sample there is clear pattern 
between loan type and collateral type, partly due to the overlapping variable definitions. As 
such, both variables will be discussed together: Generally speaking, in the retail loan sector, 
requiring collateral is a signal of risk. Most defaults occur in the collateralized or business loan 
class. For business loans, 97.52% are supported by real estate as collateral, 1.4% by fixed asset 
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collateral such as machines, 0.49% with mobile asset collateral and 0.06% with other 
collateral. Only 0.53% of business loans are not collateralized. At the other end of the 
distribution, credit cards do not require collateral and default rates are low. This can be 
explained by the fact that credit cards are still very new product, which is offered only to those 
borrowers who have close and good relationships with the bank. The exemptions to the rule are 
housing loans. Though for about 75% of these loans the house serves as collateral, less then 
1% of these loans are in default. This might indicate borrowers’ risk aversion regarding the 
loss of their house. This is consistent with culture and reality in Vietnam where people 
consider their houses as a very important feature of their life. – Furthermore, there is an 
overlap between the collateral type and residential status as only borrowers who live in their 
own home can use this as collateral. Note however that many borrowers who own more than 
one property, use a property that they do not live in as collateral for a (business) loan. This 
could again be a strong signal for the cultural importance of owning your home.  
 Collateral value reflects the value of collateral in millions of VND. This variable has 
not been used as a predictor in any CSM. In Vietnam’s developing banking market, almost 
every loan requires collateral. The higher its value, higher the incentive for the borrower to 
repay as she does not want to loose her collateral. Furthermore, the value of collateral might be 
a proxy for the borrower’s financial wealth since is has a significantly positive correlation with 
the borrower’s income (0.25) and with the loan line (0.42). 
Loan duration measures the maturity of loans in months. Usually, this is a feature of 
the loan and as such the outcome of the negotiation between borrower and bank. Whereas a 
borrower might be rejected for a shorter loan, she might be accepted for a longer one of the 
same size as the pressure on the borrower’s income is now reduced. Thus, this variable is 
usually excluded from CSMs. However, the Vietnamese situation is different. What we 
measure here is the loan duration as proposed by the borrower and not as negotiated between 
the bank and borrower. Thus, this variable reflects the borrower’s intention, risk aversion, or 
self-assessment of repayment ability.  
Time with bank measures the length of the banking relationship in years. In the context 
of relationship lending, it can be assumed that the longer a customer stays with a bank, the 
more the bank knows about him and the lower the default risk becomes. Whereas this is 
confirmed for industrialized countries (Crook et al., 1992), it does not quite hold in Vietnam. 
The highest default rate can be found for those borrowers who have been with bank for 13 to 
36 years whereas borrowers who have been with bank both shorter and longer are less likely to 
default. This could reflect the fact that the banking market is still under reform in Vietnam and 
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that at least in the medium term, credit officers have room for preferential credit allocation. A 
reform progresses and credit scoring systems are put in place, the effect of this variable is 
expected to change and should thus be updated regularly. 
Number of loans counts the number of loans a customer has received during her whole 
relationship with the bank. Many borrowers have not only a sequence of historical loans but 
also have more than one loan at a time. As a defaulted borrower has difficulties in receiving a 
new loan, this proxy can be informative about default risk. As expected, default is least 
frequent for repeat borrowers. This variable thus reflects the difficulty for a defaulted borrower 
to obtain a further loan from the same bank. 
Current account is a binary variable that indicates whether the borrower holds a current 
account. This variable is relevant because it partly represents the financial wealth of customers 
(Crook et al., 1992) and confirms another link between the customer and the bank. In our 
sample, borrowers who hold current accounts have indeed a lower default risk. 
 Savings account is defined along the same lines as current account and holders of 
savings accounts are expected to default less frequently. This expectation holds in our sample. 
Though it is clear that people might prefer to first use their savings and then start borrowing, 
there are still about 8% of borrowers who have a savings account. The possible reason is that 
their saving accounts have an insufficient balance or that their savings cannot be liquidated 
immediately without loss of interest income. Both reasons would make a loan the rational 
choice. 
 
3.3. Model estimation 
To estimate the credit scoring model, the forward stepwise method is used to select 
among the 22 variables. This method starts with a model without any independent variables 
and sequentially adds variables. At each step, the variable that leads to the greatest 
improvement in predictive accuracy – in terms of the highest score statistic conditional upon a 
significance level of less than 5% – is added. The process continues until no variable with a 
significance level of less than 5% can be found. Applying the forward stepwise method, 16 
variables are included in the model. In order to make sure that those selected variables are the 
most powerful predictors, the backward stepwise method is conducted as well. Here the 
starting point is a model that contains all 22 variables. At each step, the method eliminates the 
weakest variable so that only the strongest predictors are kept for the final model. As expected, 
the backward stepwise ends up with exactly the same 16 variables chosen by forward stepwise 
method. These variables as well as their coefficients are shown in Table 5. The six remaining 
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variables are excluded due to one of two reasons. First, they have insignificant coefficients and 
do not contribute to the explanation of the dependent variable’s variance. Second, they are 
eliminated because of their correlation with included variables. Together with adding the most 
predictive variable to the model, at every step of the backward stepwise regression, the 
tolerance (1-Ri2) of every excluded variable is calculated. Those variables with tolerances of 
less than 80% (i.e. 20% or more of the variance in the variable is explained by variation in the 
other variables) are considered for deletion. In the case of multicollinearity, the inclusion of all 
variables leads to inferior results in the hold-out sample.  
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
The most important predictor is time with bank, followed by gender, number of loans, 
and loan duration. Compared to Crook et al.’s (1992) CSM for the UK, six out of their 12 
predictors are incorporated in our model. These are: time with bank (ranked number 1st here 
versus 3rd by Crook et al.), region (6th vs. 1st), current account (8th vs. 4th), residential status (7th 
vs. 6th), home phone (14th vs. 7th), and savings account (5th vs. 9th). Compared to Crook’s 
longer list of 24 most typical variables there is an overlap with nine of our variables. As such, 
our model reflects – at least partly – the international norm of a credit scoring. The inclusion of 
variables such a collateral type, loan duration, or gender is however unique to developing 
countries. Regarding the accuracy of the model, the explanatory power of the model increase 
from step to step leading to a final adjusted R-square of 0.578. However, to properly assess the 
accuracy of the model, it should be applied out-of-sample.   
 
3.4. Model calibration and out-of-sample testing 
When applied out-of-sample, we find as expected a significant difference in the 
predicted PD between observed defaulted and non-defaulted borrowers. The average (median) 
of the predicted PD is 1.73% (0.2%) for non-defaulted loans compared to 49.05% (51.66%) for 
defaulted loans. However, the ranges of predicted probabilities are rather large and overlap for 
the two loan groups. For defaulted loans PD ranges from 0.01% to 96.81% compared to 0.00% 
to 73.54% for non-defaulted loans. A closer look at Panel A of Table 6 reveals the observed 
versus predicted PD for different sub-samples which are generated by sorting all loans of 
similar predicted PD into five groups of approximately equal size. By looking at the average 
estimated PD of 3.33% compared to the observed PD of 3.19% we can see that our model 
slightly overestimates default. There is however a pattern. The PD of the low-risk groups 1 to 3 
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are underestimated whereas the maximum estimated probability is far beyond the observed PD. 
The average predicted PDs indicate that default risk is rising steadily but only jumps above the 
1% level for group 5. A more detailed accuracy analysis is thus warranted using the PCC, 
SENS, and SPEC indicators. 
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
Panel B of Table 6 reports the accuracy measures PCC, SENS, and SPEC when 
imposing an ad-hoc cut-off value of 50%. Regarding PCC, the overall accuracy is surprisingly 
high with almost 99%. Looking at defaulted versus non-defaulted loan separately reveals that 
this high accuracy is mainly driven by the non-defaulted loans as PCCgood (99.55%) is much 
higher than PCCbad (50.25%). Compared to studies for industrialized countries, Desai et al. 
(1996) report accuracy values of up to 86.90% for PCCtotal and 41.38% for PCCbad. For 
Bolivia, Schreiner’s (1999) calibrations are able to achieve a maximum accuracy for PCCtotal of 
91%, PCCgood of 99%, and PCCbad of 71%. Overall, our results are in line with these findings.10 
The sensitivity measure implies a PD for the bank’s loan portfolio of (100% - SENS) = 1.62% 
because all applicants with a predicted PD of less than 50% will be accepted and 98.38% of 
these are expected to repay the loan. Our SENS accuracy is slightly higher than that reported in 
other studies. For example, Baesens et al.’s (2003) survey reports sensitivity measures of up to 
96.36%. Finally, the specificity of the model implies that among the rejected loan applications 
(predicted PD>50%), 78.63% of them would have actually defaulted whereas 21.37% would 
have been repaid. Note that SPEC is actually an abstract measure since in practice a bank 
cannot check whether its rejected loan applicants would have defaulted or not. These 21.37% 
incorrectly rejected loans should be interpreted as opportunity cost for the bank. In contrast, the 
1.62% of incorrectly accepted loans creates actual cost for the bank. 
 The calibration of the model, i.e. the determination of the optimal cut-off, depends on 
the preferences of the bank. The bank from which we obtained the loan data has no CSM in 
place that predicts default but is relying on subjective credit assessment. It has however set a 
target for non-performing loans. Assume that our bank’s target is 0.83%. With such a target in 
mind, we have to calibrate the CSM to a sensitivity of 99.17% (SENS = 100% - 0.83% = 
99.17%). At the first sight, one might think that in order to achieve this target, bank should 
only accept customers who have predicted PD of less than 0.83%. Such a cut-off would 
however lead to a SENS of 99.33% and thus an expected PD of 0.77%. Instead, a cut-off of 
                                            
10 See footnote 8. 
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19.95% as shown in Panel C of Table 6 would achieve the desired result. Comparing the 
accuracy of this cut-off with that of the ad-hoc cut-off of 50% reveals the following dynamics: 
By sacrificing a small amount of good loans (PCCgood drops from 99.55% to 97.74%), the 
number of incorrectly accepted bad loans increases substantially (PCCbad increases from 
50.25% to 75.06%). In terms of SENS and SPEC, the improvement by 0.79% in sensitivity is 
achieved at a cost of a 26.36% reduction in specificity.  
 
4. Credit scoring and bank strategy 
In the previous section, the cut-off value of 19.95% was chosen for the bank to achieve 
its default target of 0.83%. However, is that the optimal cut-off value for the bank if it follows 
other strategies such as minimizing the time spent on credit assessment or return 
maximization? In order to answer this question, we go to look at alternative ways to calibrate 
the CSM. 
 
4.1. Profitability 
For a commercial bank, the benefit of implementing a CSM can lie in the effect that the 
new credit assessment policy has on the bank’s profitability. Schreiner (2003) suggests 
measuring the change in profits in terms of opportunity cost. In particular he focuses on the 
ratio of good loans lost (Gb) per bad loans avoided (Bb). In the context of the accuracy criteria 
introduced above, this measure is to some extend related to the SPEC measure. Panel A of 
Figure 2 shows how this ratio changes for different cut-off values and Panel B calculates the 
effect on profit as 
 
∆profit = cost per bad loan * Bb – benefit per good loan * Gb (11) 
 
For the cut-off of 19.95% identified as optimal in the previous section, the tradeoff is foregoing 
0.91 good loans for each bad loan that is avoided. In terms of profit changes, we assume 
different relationships between the cost per bad loan and benefit per good loan. Data for 
developing countries is not available but we can take the evidence from the credit card market 
in industrialized countries as a benchmark. Here, practitioners argue that it takes 10 good loans 
to cover the cost of one bad loan (Schreiner, 2003). Under this assumption, a cut-off of 19.95% 
leads to an increase in profits, which would indicate that our bank’s target of 0.83% non-
performing loans is well set. Overall, however, the change in profits is relatively stable for a 
cut-offs of 7% to 20% before dropping off more substantially. A further look at Panel B 
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reveals that as the cost-benefit ratio becomes smaller, so does the effect on profits. With a cost-
benefit ratio of 10 to 5, an increase in profits can only be obtained with cut-off value of 7% or 
higher.  
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
4.2. Risk-based pricing 
Economic theory suggests that in a competitive market, prices will equal marginal cost. 
If the market price is higher, the high profit margin will induce competitors to enter the market 
and bid down the price. This principle implies that each loan should be priced in accordance 
with cost of funds, origination and servicing costs, and the implicit costs associated with 
potential default. While the fixed costs do not generally vary within the same product category, 
costs associated with default risk can vary across borrowers and should be calculated as PD 
times loss given default (LGD). The risk-based interest rate on a loan R could thus be derived 
in a simple model as  
 
R = cost of funds + overhead cost + expected default cost + profit margin (12) 
 
As Vietnam moves towards a more and more competitive retail banking market, borrowers will 
shop around and any bank offering too high interest rates for good borrowers will loose market 
share. At the same time, banks offering too low interest rates for bad borrowers will experience 
eroding profits. Risk-based pricing therefore seems to be necessary if a bank wants to survive 
in Vietnam’s emerging banking market. Currently, however, our bank charges the same annual 
interest rate for all medium- and long-term loans. Based on our CSM, we can suggest a simple 
pricing strategy.  
As Table 7 shows, we split the bank’s borrowers into three risk classes containing 
about 7,500 borrowers each. The predicted PD for the low risk class ranges from 0.00% to 
0.04%, for the moderate risk class from 0.05% to 0.30%, and for the high risk class from 
0.31% to 19.95%. Given the targeted maximum of 0.83% non-performing loans, any applicant 
with an estimated PD of more than 19.95% will be rejected. Based on our discussions with 
Vietnamese bankers, a 2.00% profit margin and an average 1.50% overhead cost appear to be 
reasonable and realistic assumptions. However, customers with higher risk usually create 
higher costs because they take more of the credit officer’s time. To be consistent with 
customer-specific pricing, overhead cost of 2.00%, 1.50%, and 1.00% will be allocated to the 
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high-, moderate-, and low-risk borrowers, respectively. The cost of funds can be approximated 
by the bank’s deposit interest rate. In Vietnam, the annual deposit interest rate on local 
currency deposits is currently about 9%. Finally, the expected cost of default has to be 
considered. This cost can be calculated as PD*LGD. Our CSM provides estimates for PD but it 
is beyond the scope of this study to estimate LGD. LGD will be at least loan-type specific 
since each type of loan is associated with a different type of collateral. Default cost can be 
quite significant. As a benchmark note that in 1997 risk-premia for US consumer loans ranged 
from as low as 0.10% to more than 2.00% for the highest risk borrowers (Sangha, 1998). In 
line with this study, we decided to assign 2.00% default cost to the high-risk borrowers, 0.20% 
to the moderate-risk and 0.10% to the low-risk borrowers. As Table 7 shows, the bank could 
charge 12.10%, 12.70%, and 15.00% to the different risk classes. If, on the other hand, the 
banks decide to charge the same price to all borrowers, it could charge an average interest rate 
of approximately 13.30% to earn the same profit margin. As the second set of calculations 
shows, these assumptions would be consistent with a LGD of 100% and a PD based on the 
realized PD of the risk class. In practice, PD could be based on the historic PD obtain from the 
loan portfolio which is used when estimating the CSM.  
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
4.3. Transactional versus relationship lending 
Should banks rely exclusively on their CSM, i.e. transactional lending, or should there 
be room for relationship lending? The benefits of credit scoring are clear. Mester (1997), for 
example, reports that credit scoring has substantially reduced the length of the loan approval 
process from two weeks to 12.5 hours for small-business loans in the US, or from nine to three 
days for consumer loans in Canada. Once a CSM is in place, these benefits can be achieved at 
a cost of $1.50 to $10 per loan. In order to reduce the cost, time, and effort that credit officers 
spend on loan assessment or to allocate the officers time more productively, banks might thus 
be inclined to implement a strict credit policy based on their CSM alone. In industrialized 
countries, internet banks rely on automated loan systems which include CSMs. Mester (1997) 
reports that Banc One exclusively uses credit scores for loans up to $ 35,000 and approves a 
further 30% of all loans below $ 1 million only based on scores. Furthermore, a regional bank 
in Pennsylvania assesses all small business loans under $ 35,000 based on the CSM alone. The 
downside, however, can be substantial. Schreiner (2003) recalls a Bolivian example of a 
finance company that relied exclusively on its CSM and went bankrupt.  
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Credit scoring is based on quantifiable criteria and ignores qualitative risk. Its 
underlying assumption is that qualitative risk is either irrelevant or not measurable. Is this 
assumption reasonable? If qualitative risks matter but are not captured indirectly via the 
quantitative variables in the model, the estimated PD will be too low.11 To the extent that credit 
officers can discover this qualitative risk through their relationship with the borrower, a 
combination between transactional and relationship lending is valuable. Most banks in 
industrialized countries therefore rely on such a combination. Credit scoring can either precede 
or follow traditional loan assessment. On the one hand, Schreiner (2003) argues that banks 
should apply their CSM only to loans that are already conditionally approved by the credit 
officer. On the other hand, Mester (1997) reports that banks in the US have credit officers 
reviewing the CSM’s decision and that many banks focus on those loan applicants with scores 
close to the cut-off point. For the First National Bank of Chicago this led to a substantial 
change in the credit decisions for small-business loans. About 25% of the applications rejected 
by the model were later approved by the credit officer and another 25% of the applications 
accepted by the model were later rejected by the credit officer. Based on our hold-out sample, 
we can only illustrate this second approach.12 In particular, we will illustrate how a CSM can 
be calibrated for several rather than just one cut-off point. We suggest two cut-offs C1and C2 
with 0<C1<C2<1. Such a calibration allows banks to define loans that need some further 
examinations instead of rejecting or accepting them directly. All loan applicants with an 
estimated PD<C1 are accepted outright whereas all applicants with PD>C2 are rejected 
outright. The remaining loans with (C1<PD<C2) are classified as marginal loans which are 
consequently reviewed by the credit officer. The bank’s credit assessment can thus be a 
combination of the transactional lending via CSM and relationship lending. 
 Panel D of Table 6 reports the results of such a CSM. C1 and C2 are determined 
according to a somewhat arbitrary decision rule which can be interpreted in the context of 
PCC. This rule specifies that (1) the proportion of incorrectly classified bad loans should be 
less than 5% of all bad loans, i.e. Bg/B<5%, and (2) that the proportion of correctly classified 
bad loans should be at least 75% of all bad loans, i.e. Bb/B≥75%. The emphasis on bad loans is 
justified by the relatively high penalty costs associated with over looking a potentially bad 
loan. The trade off for this cost is the gain from reducing the number of good loans subjected 
to evaluation. If those evaluation costs were available, C1 and C2 can be determined so that 
total evaluation cost is minimized. For an even more advanced approach, evaluation cost can 
                                            
11 See Schreiner (2003), Box 4 for a more in-depth discussion. 
12 Note however that Schreiner’s approach is to some extend implicit in our sample as it is restricted to approved 
loans and does not cover all loan applications. 
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be included in the model presented in section 4.1. and C1 and C2 can be chosen based on a 
profit maximization rule. However, since these costs have not yet been precisely estimated by 
our bank, the above decision rule has been applied resulting in the cut-off points C1= 1% and 
C2= 21%.  
The model predicts 19,063 good, 4,836 marginal and 1,141 bad loans. Regarding the 
actual bad loans, 40 were classified as good, 155 as marginal and 603 as bad. The implication 
for credit assessment is that the 40 loans will not be evaluated by the credit officer but 
incorrectly accepted outright. The 155 loans will be examined together with the 4,681 other 
marginal loans. If the credit officer can correctly spot these 155 loans, the bank would reject 
758 of the 798 actual bad loans. In contrast, the CSM with a single cut-off of 19.95% (50%) 
leads to a rejection of only 599 (401) of the observed bad loans. Regarding the observed good 
loans, our two cut-off points do not lead to any substantial change compared to the models 
with one cut-off point. This is due to the criteria imposed on the cut-off points. Assuming 
again that the credit officer can correctly spot the 4,681 observed good loans among the 
marginal loans, the bank would accept 23,704 of the 24,245 observed good loans. In 
comparison, the model with one cut-off at 19.95% (50%) achieves a correct prediction of 
23,698 (24,136) loans. 
 
5. Conclusions 
As banking markets in developing countries are maturing, banks face competition not 
only from other domestic banks but also from sophisticated foreign banks. Combined with a 
dramatic growth of retail credit and increased regulatory attention on risk management, the 
development of a well-functioning credit assessment framework is essential. As part of such a 
framework, we develop a CSM for Vietnamese retail loans. Though many of the borrower 
characteristics relevant for the credit decision are the same as in developed countries, they 
show different relationships with default risk and as such reveal economic and cultural aspects 
that are unique to Vietnam as a developing country. While we investigate special features of 
the CMS related to a bank’s strategy in terms of profitability or risk-based pricing and discuss 
the role of relationship versus transactional lending, some aspects of credits scoring remain 
unexplored. In this study, we only provide a single estimation of the CSM. In practice, 
however, banks need to update their CSM on a regular basis. For developing countries where 
economic changes are more pronounced than in the relatively stable developed countries, it 
would be interesting to investigate how stable a CSM is over time. It might turn out that a 
regular update of its CSM is even more important for a bank in a developing than in a 
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developed country. Furthermore, it might be interesting to compare CSM of banking markets 
that are in various stages of development. In this way one could explore any linkages that exist 
between the features that determine loan default, i.e. the variables included in the CSM and 
their relative importance, and financial and economic development.  
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Panel A: The initial frequency of default based on the duration of the loan
Panel B: The categorized frequency of default based on the duration of the loan
Panel C: The relationship between default and duration after coding
Figure 1
Coding quantitative variables when the relationship to default is non-linear
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Panel A: Opportunity cost as good loans lost per bad loans avoided
Panel B: Change in profit
Figure 2
Credit scoring and bank profitability
0
2
4
6
8
0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70
cut-off
go
od
 lo
an
s l
os
t p
er
 b
ad
 lo
an
s a
vo
id
ed
(G
b/
B
b)
-60000
-50000
-40000
-30000
-20000
-10000
0
10000
0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70
cut-off
ch
an
ge
 in
 p
ro
fit
cost(bad)=10, benefit(good)=1 cost(bad)=10, benefit(good)=5
cost(bad)=10, benefit(good)=10 cost(bad)=10, benefit(good)=12
Crook et al.  (1992) - UK Schreiner (1999) - Bolivia Vigano (1993) - Burkina Faso
Postcode Postcode (1) Date of disbursement Customer's personal characteristics
Age Employment status (2) Amount disbursed   (age, sex, religion, martial status, education, 
Number of children Years at bank (3) Type of guarantee   employment sector and place, etc)
Number of other dependants Current account (4) Branch Data on the enterprise
Whether an applicants has a home phone Spouse’s income (5) Loan officer   (type, professional skills, number of employees,
Spouse’s income Residential status (6) Gender of the borrower   productivity, profitability, etc)
Employment status Phone (7) Sector of the firm Profitability
Employment category Years at present employment (8) Number of spells or arrears   (main and secondary revenue, revenue stability)
Years at present employment Deposit account (9) Length of the longest spell of arrears Amount and composition of assets
Income Value of home (10)   (total assets including money and deposits)
Residential status Outgoings (11) Financial situation
Years at present address Number of children (12)   (initial and current amount of loans received,
Estimated value of home Applicant’s income (NI)   defaults, loans granted)
Mortgage balance outstanding Mortgage balance outstanding (NI) Investment plans
Years at bank Charge card (NI)   (presence of investment plan, other sources of
Whether a current account is held    finance)
Whether a deposit account is held Customer's relationship with bank
Whether a loan account is held   (past loans with bank, savings account with 
Whether a check guarantee card is held   bank, etc)
Whether a major credit card is held Bank's control of credit risk
Whether a charge card is held   (loan distination, disbursement form, method
Whether a store card is held   of repayment, loan amount and maturity, collateral,
Whether a building society card is held   contractual conditions on interest rate, etc)
Value of outgoings
commonly used variables in industrialized 
countries
variables included in the credit scoring model
Table 1
Variables commonly used in retail credit scoring models
When available, a rank indicating the importance of the variable in the credit scoring model is given in brackets. (NI) indicates that a variable was considered but finally not included.
The first colum is based on Crook et al. (1992).
observation non-default default PCC
non-default Gg Gb PCCgood = Gg / (Gg+Gb)
default Bg Bb PCCbad = Bb / (Bb+Bg)
PCCtotal = (Gg+Bb) / (Gg+Gb+Bb+Bg)
SENS Gg / (Gg+Bg)
SPEC Bb / (Bb+Gb)
Table 2
Predictive accuracy of credit scoring models
prediction
Panel A: Variables considered in the first round of credit assessment
variable categories
age 18-25, 26-40, 41-60, >60 (years)
education post graduate, graduate, high school, less than high school
occupation professional, secretary, businessman, pensioner
total time in employment <0.5, 0.5-1, 1-5, >5 (years)
time in current job <0.5, 0.5-1, 1-5, >5 (years)
residential status Owns home, rents, lives with parents, other
number of dependents 0, 1-3, 3-5, >5 (people)
applicant's annual income <12, 12-36, 36-120, >120 (million VND)
family’s annual income <24, 24-72, 72-240, >240 (million VND)
Panel B: Variables considered in the second round of credit assessment
variable categories
performance history with bank (short-term) new customer, never delaid, payment delay less than 30 days, payment delay more than 30 days
performance history with bank (long-term) new customer, never delaid, delay during 2 recent years, delay earlier than 2 recent years
total outstanding loan value <100, 100-500, 500-1000, >1000 (million VND)
other services used savings account, credit card, savings account and credit card, none
average balance in saving account during previous year <20, 20-100, 100-500, >500 (million VND)
Panel C: Loan decision
applicant's rating score loan decision
Aaa >= 400 lend as much as requested by borrower
Aa 351-400 lend as much as requested by borrower
a 301-350 lend as much as requested by borrower
Bbb 251-300 loan amount depends on the type of collateral
Bb 201-250 loan amount depend on the type of collateral with assessment 
b 151-200 loan application requires further assessment
Ccc 101-150 reject loan application
Cc 51-100 reject loan application
c 0-50 reject loan application
d 0 reject loan application
Table 3
An example of credit assessment in Vietnam
variables categories default
income (0.5-1.5) 7.93%
(in million VND per month) (1.5-3.5) 1.51%
(3.5-8.0) 0.29%
(>8.0) 0.13%
other 4.07%
education post graduate 0.30%
university graduate 1.23%
college graduate 9.02%
high school graduate 2.40%
non-high school graduate 3.96%
other 1.48%
occupation farmer, housewife, student 3.37%
entrepreneur, farm owner, consultant/broker 0.23%
doctor, professional, researcher, lawyer, teacher 1.90%
police, military, journalist 6.07%
other 0.85%
employer type self-employed (entrepreneur) 0.22%
joint-venture, foreign 0.22%
joint-stock, state-owned 1.06%
other 3.98%
time with employer (0-2) 2.31%
(in years) (2-5) 2.09%
(5-10) 2.72%
(10-20) 4.44%
(20-35) 3.37%
age (18-24) 1.98%
(in years) (25-35) 2.94%
(36-45) 3.27%
(46-64) 2.91%
(>65) 4.66%
gender male 3.80%
female 2.49%
region north 0.32%
centre 26.16%
south (except Ho Chi Minh City) 2.14%
Ho Chi Minh City 0.20%
time at present address (0-2) 0.71%
(in years) (2-5) 0.68%
(5-10) 1.35%
(10-20) 2.95%
(20-60) 4.86%
other 34.89%
residential status home owner (home not used as collateral) 3.36%
home owner (home used as collateral) 0.64%
living with parents 2.94%
rental 2.36%
other 0.71%
marital status married 3.40%
single 2.19%
widowed, divorced 2.27%
other 5.75%
number of dependants 0 1.06%
1 3.06%
2 2.46%
3 4.33%
>3 6.69%
Table 4
Variables included in the Vietnamese retail credit scoring model
variables categories default
home phone yes 0.92%
no 8.53%
mobile phone yes 0.40%
no 4.41%
loan purpose business 5.05%
house 0.95%
collateralized 11.96%
general credit 1.29%
credit card 0.10%
collateral type real estate 0.41%
mobile asset 7.13%
fixed asset (machine) 2.86%
no collateral 7.30%
collateral value (0-50) 5.57%
(in million VND) (51-100) 4.62%
(101-500) 0.68%
(501-1000) 0.24%
(>1000) 0.20%
loan duration (<13) 2.37%
(in years) (13-24) 1.59%
(25-36) 3.12%
(37-48) 7.35%
(>48) 2.16%
time  with bank (<13) 2.38%
(in years) (13-24) 5.62%
(25-36) 4.30%
(>36) 0.95%
number of loans 1 7.94%
2 1.49%
3 0.74%
>3 0.15%
current account yes 1.34%
no 4.22%
savings account yes 0.11%
no 3.54%
Table 4 (cont.)
Variables included in the Vietnamese retail credit scoring model
included variables
estimated 
coefficient
standard 
error
significance 
level
time with bank -1.774 0.121 0.0%
gender -1.557 0.222 1.0%
number of loans -0.938 0.051 1.4%
loan duration -0.845 0.080 3.7%
deposit account -0.750 0.104 3.1%
region -0.652 0.030 13.6%
residential status -0.551 0.278 44.6%
current account -0.492 0.208 10.4%
collateral value -0.402 0.096 9.8%
number of dependants -0.356 0.096 9.9%
time at present address -0.285 0.054 2.5%
marital status -0.233 0.101 68.1%
collateral type -0.190 0.057 53.0%
home phone -0.181 0.047 3.4%
education -0.156 0.067 60.3%
loan purpose -0.125 0.054 3.3%
constant -3.176 0.058 4.6%
Table 5
The credit scoring model's variables and estimated coefficients
Note that the variables are selected based on the stepwise method. In this
table the included variables are ranked by absolute value of the
coefficients.
Panel A: Default probabilities by loan group
group observed minimum average maximum
1 5,091       0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02
2 4,956       0.08 0.03 0.06 0.12
3 5,007       0.27 0.13 0.24 0.41
4 4,929       1.11 0.42 0.77 1.79
5 5,060       49.31 1.80 15.41 96.81
total 25,043     3.19 0.00 3.33 96.81
Panel B: Predictive accuracy with a cut-off of 0.50
observation non-default default
non-default 24,136                    109 99.55%  = PCCgood
default 397                         401 50.25%  = PCCbad
97.98%  = PCCtotal
SENS 98.38%
SPEC 78.63%
Panel C: Predictive accuracy with an optimal cut-off of 0.1995
observation non-default default
non-default 23,698                    547 97.74%  = PCCgood
default 199                         599 75.06%  = PCCbad
97.02%  = PCCtotal
SENS 99.17%
SPEC 52.27%
Panel D: A credit scoring model with two cut-offs of 0.01 and 0.21
observation non-default marginal default
non-default 19,023 4,681 541
default 40 155 603
Bg/B 5.01%
Bb/B 75.56%
prediction
Table 6
probability of default (in %)
predicted
prediction
PCC
PCC
Predicted versus observed probabilities of default in the hold-out 
sample
number of 
loans
prediction
low risk moderate risk high risk all borrowers
range of predicted PD 0.00%-0.04% 0.05%-0.30% 0.31%-19.95% 0.00%-19.95%
number of loans 7,424                 7,557                 7,842                 22,823                
overhead cost 1.00% 1.50% 2.00% 1.50%
cost of funds 9.00% 9.00% 9.00% 9.00%
profit margin 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00%
cost of default 0.10% 0.20% 2.00%
loan interest rate 12.10% 12.70% 15.00% 13.30%
LD = average observed PD 0.13% 0.33% 1.98% 0.83%
LGD 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
cost of default = LD * LGD 0.13% 0.33% 1.98% 0.83%
loan interest rate 12.13% 12.83% 14.98% 13.33%
Risk-based loan pricing
Table 7
borrower class
